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Periodic review in natural resource contracts 
This brief looks at the use of requirements in the extractive industries for 
investors and the government to meet at regular intervals to consider 
whether the terms of the agreement between them require adjustment. 
Through reviewing existing agreements, the brief considers how the 
requirements have been expressed to-date and their role as a tool to 
maintain the relationship between the parties. Finally, the brief suggests 
a new approach to the drafting of these mechanisms. 
Review mechanisms can play 
a role in managing the 
relationship between the 
parties.  
There are different triggers 
required for parties to start 
discussions on modifying the 
terms of the contract. 
 
The mechanisms identified 
lack strong obligations on the 
parties to do more than 
discuss potential changes. 
 
1. Introduction 
Large-scale investments in extractive 
industries can be plagued by demands 
for renegotiation, sometimes leading to 
arbitration or litigation and causing a 
breakdown in the relationship between 
the host country and the investor. The 
nature of these investments - long-
term, lasting for 20 to 50 years or 
longer - means that it can be difficult 
to predict at the outset what 
conditions will exist over the course of 
the investment. It is very likely that 
the circumstances at the time the 
original agreement is entered into will 
change, driven for example by 
resource cycles or a changing 
political environment.  
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A new approach may be to 
provide objective criteria in the 
contract at the outset, for the 
parties to determine whether a 
renegotiation should occur and     
if so, the parameters of the 
renegotiation.   
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As the balance of risks and benefits changes, parties 
request modifications to the terms and conditions of 
the investment . Accordingly, mechanisms are needed 
in these agreements to smooth the process of dealing 
with the inevitability of changing circumstances. 
“Periodic Review Mechanisms”, provisions that 
formally require parties to meet at particular intervals 
to review the terms of the contract or license and 
consider whether circumstances have changed since 
the parties’ initial agreement, are one such 
mechanism. Contractually provided periodic reviews 
give the parties an opportunity to negotiate and 
readjust contractual provisions. Worst case scenarios 
often arise out of long term frustration by one or 
several of the parties which can result in expropriations 
with years of ensuing litigation or international 
arbitration. Provided that the parties take advantage of 
the opportunity to renegotiate terms, the contract terms 
and conditions can be readjusted before the parties 
are so desperate and frustrated that the investor 
decides to stop work or the Government decides to 
terminate permits and concessions 
However, our research does not suggest that Periodic 
Review Mechanisms are widely used. Although forms 
of such mechanisms have been included in contracts 
as early as the 1970si, a review undertaken for the 
purpose of this brief of publicly available extractive 
industry contracts and of extractive industry 
databasesii, identified such mechanisms only in 
contracts published by the Liberia Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (LEITI)iii and the Model Mine 
Development Agreement prepared by the International 
Bar Association in 2011 (MMDA).iv With regard to the 
legislative approach, Tanzania’s Mining Code is one 
example (and the only one we found) of legislation that 
contains such a mechanism.v The Periodic Review 
Mechanisms in the Liberian contracts are broadly 
representative of the examples in the MMDA and this 
brief therefore analyzes the Liberian contracts in order 
to better understand such mechanisms.vi  
Although the focus of this brief is on Periodic Review 
Mechanisms (Section 3), the fourth section will 
consider mechanisms that are not initiated periodically 
but at the request of one of the parties (At Request 
Review Mechanisms), providing additional insight into 
the issue of the parties’ obligations to modify the 
contract (Section 4). Section 5 identifies problems that 
arise in practice under Periodic Review Mechanism 
and Section 6 outlines a new approach to the review of 
contracts – providing objective criteria for the parties to 
determine whether a renegotiation should occur and if 
so, the parameters of the renegotiation. The final 
section will look at strengths and weaknesses of the 
Periodic and At Request Review Mechanisms, and 
suggest ways to strengthen obligations if the parties so 
decided (Section 7). 
2. Review mechanisms – Overview 
Annex 1 sets out clauses containing review 
mechanisms from two contracts (Mining Contract 2 
and Oil Contract 10). Each contains three types of 
review process (which are not mutually exclusive), 
broadly described as follows:  
a. A regular meeting between the parties, once 
every five (5) years, to discuss in good faith 
whether any modifications are required to the 
terms of the contract in light of “any substantial 
changes in circumstance” (in Oil Contract 10, this 
periodic meeting only occurs if a party requests it 
with 45 days’ notice). This review process is 
referred to in this brief as “Periodic Review”, as it 
envisages a meeting between the parties at 
regular intervals. 
b. An “on-demand” meeting, if either party makes a 
request on the basis that a particular event 
(Trigger Event) has occurred such that the 
contract requires modifications. In the examples 
in Annex 1, the Trigger Event is a “Profound 
Change of Circumstance” (PCC - described in 
Section 3.2 below). The parties must meet to 
determine whether a PCC has occurred, and if so 
must discuss in good faith any changes required 
to the contract. This review process is referred to 
in this brief as “Trigger-At-Request-Review”, as 
the meeting may take place at any time upon a 
party’s request, but the parties only discuss 
changes to the contract if they establish a 
particular Trigger Event has occurred (i.e., PCC). 
c. An “on-demand” meeting at any time that a party 
requests, to discuss any matter “affecting the 
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rights and obligations of the parties”. The parties 
must discuss in good faith the matter raised. This 
type of review process is referred to in this brief 
as an “Automatic-At-Request-Review” as either 
party can request it at any time without the need 
to establish a Trigger Event. 
 
These different review processes broadly represent 
the procedures set forth in many of the contracts 
reviewed herein, although each contract’s provisions 
may vary slightly from the above provisions. 
In the contracts reviewed, the “Review Process” can 
be described by the following elements. 
a. “Initiation of the Review” (3.1. and 4.1.) - in regular 
meetings at defined intervals (3.1.) or in ad hoc 
meetings at the request of one of them (4.1.), the 
parties start the Review Process. The Review Process 
does not necessarily lead to the parties actually 
discussing changes to the contract.  
b. “Modification Process” (3.2., 3.3. and 4.2., 4.3.) - the 
process during which the parties consider in good faith 
and possibly make modifications to the contract, as 
they agree is necessary in light of changed 
circumstances. 
c. “Trigger Event” (3.2. and 4.2.) - a particular 
circumstance that the parties during the Review 
Process must agree has occurred before they enter 
into the Modification Process. In case the particular 
circumstance has not occurred, the Review Process 
stops and a Modification Process does not proceed. 
For some At Request Review Mechanisms, it is not 
necessary to establish a Trigger Event before 
commencing the Modification Process. 
d. “Obligations of the parties” (3.3. and 4.3.) - the 
parties’ obligations during the Modification Process, 
typically to discuss the matters raised and to consider 
in good faith possible changes to the contract. 
 
3. Periodic Review in Liberian Contracts 
In the contracts reviewed for this Brief, seven (7) out of 
20 Mining Contractsvii and two (2) out of the 10 Oil 
Contractsviii contain Periodic Review Mechanisms. 
3.1. Initiation of the Periodic Review 
At pre-defined intervals over the course of the 
investment, the parties are required to meet and 
consult, with the aim of establishing whether or not a 
Trigger Event has occurred. In all but one of the 
Liberian Mining Contractsix, as well as in the two Oil 
Contracts with Periodic Review Mechanisms, this 
interval is five (5) years.x 
3.2. Trigger Event in Periodic Review 
The Trigger Event is a crucial element of the Periodic 
Review Mechanisms, because it starts the Modification 
Process. In order for a Modification Process to take 
place, the parties must agree that the Trigger Event 
has occurred (which is not a given).   
Typically, the Trigger Event can only be inferred from 
the Periodic Review Mechanisms. In these cases, it is 
defined as “any substantial changes in 
circumstances.”xi  
Other contracts, however, are explicit in requiring a 
Trigger Event and the event is defined in more detail; 
in order for the Modification Process to begin the 
parties must establish the occurrence of PCC.xii PCC is 
generally defined as “such changes […] in the 
economic conditions of the mineral and mining industry 
worldwide or in Liberia, or such changes in the 
economic, political or social circumstances existing in 
Liberia specifically or elsewhere in the world at large 
as to result in such a material and fundamental 
alteration of the conditions, assumptions and bases 
relied upon […] that the overall balance of equities and 
benefits reasonably anticipated by them will no longer 
as a practical manner be achievable.”  
If the parties fail to agree that the Trigger Event has 
occurred, the Review Process terminates. The 
contracts reviewed herein generally do not specify 
whether (or not) the dispute over the existence of a 
Trigger Event can or should be arbitrated. One 
contract, Oil Contract 10, explicitly provides that the 
clauses dealing with the Review Process will not be 
subject to the contract’s dispute resolution provisions. 
If the parties agree, the Modification Process begins 
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and the obligations of the parties relative to this 
process are triggered. 
3.3. Obligations of the Parties during the Periodic 
Review 
Typically, the obligation of one party to negotiate and 
accept a proposal to modify the contract made by the 
other party during the Modification Process is relatively 
weak: parties are only required to enter into 
discussions in good faith.xiii Exceptionally, contracts 
provide sanctions to persuade the other party to 
negotiate and accept proposals for modification from 
the other party(ies). One contract provides that certain 
tax exemptions expire unless they are renewed during 
the Review Process:  
“Not less than every 7 years after the 
commencement of commercial production, the 
parties shall consult together in Liberia for the 
purpose of considering such changes in or 
clarifications of this Agreement as either party 
deems to be appropriate. Unless otherwise 
renewed in writing by the Government prior to the 
conclusion of each such consultation, the 
exemptions provided in Section 16.4 shall expire 
six (6) months after the date herein provided for the 
commencement of such consultation [emphasis 
added].” xiv 
The examples of Periodic Review Mechanisms in the 
MMDA also reveal relatively weak obligations, other 
than one example, from an Australian land use 
agreement (see Note iv), which provides that its 
original terms will not continue if the parties do not 
reach agreement during the Review Process.xv  
In conclusion, the language used in the Periodic 
Review Mechanisms clearly leaves consensus to 
modify the contract solely in the hands of the parties. If 
there is no agreement, no modification is made. The 
only real obligation in the majority of contracts is the 
duty to act in good faith while discussing and 
considering possible modifications to the contract, but 
most contracts do not provide parameters as to what 
will be considered “good faith”. One contract that does 
provide some guidance, emphasizes that there is no 
requirement to make any changes, stipulating that: 
“’good faith discussions’ and ‘consultation’ shall not 
require a Party to agree to any modifications to this 
Contract […].”xvi Given this emphasis on “good faith” 
discussions, one area for further research would be to 
analyze how arbitral tribunals treat such a duty and 
what sort of obligations, if any, may be attached to 
such duty. 
4. At-Request-Review in Liberian Contracts  
As illustrated in Section 2 above, in addition to the 
Periodic Review Mechanisms, there are two types of 
At Request Review Mechanisms in the Liberian 
contracts. Both include a consultation that is initiated 
by the request of one of the parties. However, some 
clauses require the parties to establish that a Trigger 
Event has occurred in order to start the Modification 
Process when the parties meet (Trigger-At-Request-
Review), while for others, the request itself sets the 
Modification Process in motion (Automatic-At-Request-
Review). The obligations of the parties to agree to any 
modifications to the contract are weaker for the 
Automatic-At-Request-Review than for the Trigger-At-
Request-Review. 
4.1. Initiation of the At Request Review 
Both At-Request-Review Mechanisms can be initiated 
by the request of one of the parties, at any time. In 
Trigger-At-Request-Review mechanisms, the request 
usually must be based on the perception by the party 
making the request that a particular Trigger Event has 
occurred (i.e., PCC) and in all cases the parties only 
discuss changes to the contract if they agree that a 
Trigger Event has occurred. 
4.2. Trigger Event in Trigger-At-Request-Review 
In the Liberian contracts, the Trigger Event of the 
Trigger-At-Request-Review Mechanism is always 
defined as PCC. The definition of PCC differs slightly 
between the Mining and Agriculture Contracts, on the 
one hand and the Oil Contracts, on the other hand. 
The Mining Contracts and Agriculture Contracts all 
contain almost identical language to define PCC: “such 
changes…in the economic conditions of the mineral 
and mining industry worldwide or in Liberia, or such 
changes in the economic, political or social 
  
5 
 
circumstances existing in Liberia specifically or 
elsewhere in the world at large as to result in such a 
material and fundamental alteration of the conditions, 
assumptions and bases relied upon by the parties at 
such base period that the overall balance of equities 
and benefits reasonably anticipated by them will no 
longer as a practical manner be achievable [emphasis 
added].”xvii   
The Oil Contracts, however, refer to changes in 
“economic conditions” and then more broadly to 
changes, without any limitation to changes in the 
“economic, political or social circumstances”: “such 
changes in the economic conditions of the petroleum 
industry world wide or in Liberia or such changes that 
result in such a material and fundamental alteration of 
the conditions and assumptions relied upon by the 
Parties at the Effective Date of this Contract […] to the 
effect that the overall balance of the equities and 
benefits reasonably anticipated by the Parties will no 
longer be achievable [emphasis added].” There is only 
one exception to this pattern in the Oil Contracts, 
found in the most recent contract from 2013, which is 
similar to the Mining and Agriculture Contracts.xviii  
4.3. Obligations of the Parties during the At-Request-
Review 
The obligations of the parties during the Modification 
Process of the Trigger-At-Request-Review clauses are 
very similar to those in the Periodic Review clauses, in 
general a requirement that the parties make any 
changes that they agree “in good faith” are 
necessary.xix Automatic-At-Request-Review clauses 
provide even weaker obligations for the parties to 
agree to any modification proposals made by the other 
side: “the parties shall take such action, if any, that is 
mutually agreed to address the matter.”xx 
5. Issues encountered in practice 
As this review indicates, many Periodic Review 
clauses have very broad and imprecise wording. This 
gives rise to disagreements over whether or not the 
circumstances alleged by one party can justify a 
renegotiation or whether or not a Trigger Event has 
occurred.  Thus, instead of negotiating, for example, 
new financial terms and work schedules, the parties 
exhaust much time, effort and initial goodwill arguing 
over the pertinence and reality of the facts alleged by 
one of the parties. Over time, goodwill often turns to 
bad faith negotiations with allegations that the 
numbers produced by one of the parties are not 
trustworthy and cannot be relied upon as the basis to 
renegotiate terms and conditions. The higher the 
financial stakes, the more unlikely the parties will 
agree that events have resulted in a grave 
disequilibrium in the contract conditions. 
The parties use many arguments to justify the status 
quo, depending upon which party has benefited from 
the alleged change in circumstances. 
The investor which benefits from a windfall profit often 
will argue against a renegotiation requested by the 
Government by stating that the sudden rise in prices of 
the commodity (for example) was foreseeable in long 
term contracts and that the new-found profit is a fair 
return for the assumed project risk.  Moreover, it will 
argue that since it pays more taxes (if such is the 
case), the Government benefits from the increased tax 
revenue.   
If the issue is a prolonged investor loss as opposed to 
a windfall profit, the investor often will argue that 
unforeseeable geological challenges or a drop in the 
commodity prices (for example) makes its investment 
worthless or much less valuable to it thereby setting 
the scene for a work stoppage to force negotiations. 
Similarly, the same argument can be made in the case 
of Government-initiated modifications to the tax regime 
in the absence of freezing or stabilization clauses. In 
response to commodity price decreases or geological 
challenges, the Government can argue that a sharp 
rise or fall in commodity prices is foreseeable (even if it 
is forced to admit that the timing and extent of the 
variations in price are not) and that the investor 
assumed the risk of geological challenges. 
In order to mitigate or eliminate Government-initiated 
modifications in the tax regime, investors most often 
require tax stabilization which affords foreseeability at 
least for one of the elements used to calculate the 
return on investment (ROI). However, such 
stabilization does not address all of the other variables 
in long-term extractive industry contracts. 
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Although the above arguments appear reasonable, 
depending upon which party is making them and under 
which circumstances, a Government is likely reluctant 
to sit down with investors to readjust royalties, tax 
benefits and the like when prices fall and/or the quality 
or quantity of the commodity is less advantageous 
than forecast and/or the geology turns out to be much 
more difficult than foreseen, and an investor will be 
reluctant to discuss with the Government readjusting 
financial terms when it is experiencing windfall profits. 
6. A new approach 
6.1. The approach – setting objective criteria  
Circumscribing the scope of negotiations and 
accusations of the use of unreliable data, by using 
objective criteria and supporting financial data to 
calculate a base line for the parties’ financial 
expectations may increase the chance of success in 
Periodic Reviews. The purpose of the base line 
calculations is to share the partners’ financial 
expectations at the beginning of the project. These 
expectations would be reexamined by comparing the 
base line figures with actual figures at contractually 
defined intervals or at party requested intervals or 
both, to ascertain whether circumstances have 
resulted in the financial reality for one or several of the 
parties being very far off the base line expectations 
such that renegotiations are warranted. If the investor’s 
projections turn out to be wildly off base, it is likely that 
the Government’s revenue projections will be as well, 
thereby giving the parties a reality based incentive to 
renegotiate. 
The base line calculations would be attached to the 
contractual framework when it is first negotiated and 
signed. For example, in the Schedule setting out the 
investor’s investment requirements (work schedules, 
amounts to be invested etc.), the investor could set out 
its expected ROI for each phase of the project 
(feasibility study, exploration, infrastructure 
construction, commercial production and sale phases 
of the project etc.). The more information and data 
shared by the investor in calculating its ROI, the more 
reliable the base line will be. 
The investor’s base line could take the form of a 
mathematical formula wherein its numbers affecting 
the future profitability of the project are inserted 
(CAPEX, OPEX, financial costs not accounted for in 
the CAPEX, projected average sale price of 
commodity, etc.), to predict a projected ROI during 
each of the major phases of the project (which could 
be a loss for example for the feasibility and exploration 
stage). This method would not necessarily require the 
investor to divulge all of the detailed data used to 
calculate its projected CAPEX and OPEX, but it would 
hold the investor responsible for its projected base line 
ROI for each stage of the project, in order to evaluate 
whether or not the financial and other conditions of the 
contract should be renegotiated. 
For the Government, the projections of revenue from 
royalties, land fees, taxes etc. and the time line for 
their receipt would also be attached to the contractual 
framework. The Government calculations will, to a 
large extent, rely on the investor’s projections of 
quantities, quality and sale price but the Government 
could conceivably arrive at its revenue projections 
through independent analysis, which is always 
preferable to relying solely on the investor’s figures.   
6.2. Data required 
To ensure reliable long term numbers, the data for 
each stage of the project would be input into the 
formula during each stage of the project and the 
cumulated ROI would be exchanged by the parties at 
contractually defined periods during each project stage 
or upon the request of one of the parties or both. If the 
resulting ROI calculations vary by more than one or 
several negotiated fixed percentage(s), the parties 
would be obligated to renegotiate in order to attain or 
readjust their respective expectations as set forth in 
the initial contractual framework. The parties could 
also decide to modify the base line figures and the 
percentage of difference that will trigger a 
renegotiation. Moreover, different percentages could 
be used for different stages of the project; if the parties 
feel that the application of one sole percentage 
(difference of more or less than 10% of the base line 
ROI, for example) would not take into account all of the 
variables. Furthermore, the percentage should be 
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applied in both upturn and downturn situations: ROI 
higher or lower than that projected in the contractual 
documents.  
The factors which can be renegotiated are numerous: 
tax holidays, incentives, rates, customs duties, 
depreciation methods, royalty rates, income tax, land 
fees, fees on transportation infrastructure (if a fee 
sharing method has been adopted for rail cars, 
highways etc), when these issues are set forth in 
contractual arrangements, rather than in the country’s 
law. The permit validity period and work obligations 
could also be adjusted to permit a longer (or shorter) 
period for the recovery of CAPEX by the investor. 
6.3. Detailed financial information required 
A major issue in the negotiation of extractive contracts 
is the unequal knowledge base of the contracting 
parties. Investors inevitably have more information at 
hand to make savvy investment decisions. 
Governments, on the other hand, have difficulty getting 
evaluations of their mineral or hydrocarbon reserves 
from neutral third parties due to cost constraints as 
they do not have easy access to the economic and 
financial experts needed to construct realistic tax, 
royalties, production sharing and other essential 
economic and financial projectionsxxi.  
The primary purpose of setting forth detailed financial 
expectations in the contractual framework is to permit 
the parties to set a mutually agreed base line for 
financial returns for each of the parties. The numbers 
and assumptions used by investors and their lenders 
to decide whether or not to invest are crucial 
information which, if shared in a confidential, 
commercially constructive manner, would serve to 
build trust between the partners in the investment and 
allow for renegotiations based on objective criteria 
depending upon the stage of the project and which 
party has incurred the cost: the cost of 
digging/drilling/excavation, the cost of bringing water 
and electricity to the site, the cost of relocating 
populations, the quality of the commodity extracted 
which will affect its sale price, the actual tonnage 
which can be extracted at a reasonable rate of ROI, 
the cost of transportation of the commodity to bring it 
to sale to third parties etc.  
The same is true for the Government: the calculations 
by the Government’s economists of tax and royalty 
revenue and other financial considerations must be 
taken into account in order to evaluate whether or not 
the numbers for the royalty percentage, land fees, 
income tax rate calculations etc. are reasonable and 
close to accurate or mistaken, grossly erroneous etc. 
so that the negotiations can be based on the parties 
real interests and not on secret and undocumented 
calculations. 
This “mathematical” method would have an additional 
advantage of forcing the contracting parties to be 
transparent and share their knowledge and financial 
expectations.  
6.4. Dealing with confidentiality 
A key problem with this approach is convincing 
investors to share their information and know-how, 
which is often considered proprietary. Certain investors 
understandably will not want to divulge such 
information. However, if information, data and financial 
projections can be “sanitized” and if the other 
partners/parties are obliged to respect confidentiality 
subject to stiff automatic penalties, there may be room 
for the exchange of sufficient data to make this method 
work.  
For example, the data used to establish feasibility 
studies could be licensed to the Government on an 
exclusive basis for a modest fee. This could give the 
data the intellectual property protections required to 
reassure the investor, while giving the Government 
access to valuable data concerning its own reserves. 
The license fee could be incorporated into the royalty 
for a fixed period of time. To make this type of 
arrangement work, the investor would have to 
communicate to the Government the cost of the 
feasibility study so that the Government’s payment for 
its use makes commercial sense. Perhaps, the 
Government would want to purchase the data and the 
feasibility study for its cost plus a small percentage. At 
the very least, the parties can give the data and the 
feasibility study a value to be taken into account when 
calculating the ROI of the investor and the ROI of the 
Government. 
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7. Conclusions  
The analysis shows that the importance of review 
provisions rests in their ability to maintain dialogue 
between the parties and to create an opening to 
discuss changed circumstances and the potential for 
revision, in situations that perhaps the parties could 
not have listed with any specificity at the outset. The 
Periodic Review Mechanisms identified tend to impose 
an obligation to discuss; the parties are required to 
meet and consult, but there is little obligation for them 
to make any changes to the contract during a review. 
In many cases the only requirement is that the parties 
act in good faith. While the contracts reviewed rarely 
define “good faith” in this context, it would be 
worthwhile considering how arbitral tribunals have 
interpreted this term. Further, most Review 
Mechanisms provide for the continuation of the original 
contract provisions if the parties fail to agree to any 
modification, adding to the lack of bite that some 
practitioners attribute to Periodic Review Mechanisms. 
The analysis also showed that a number of contracts 
contain three separate avenues for consultation 
between the parties. Given the absence of obligations 
in each to do more than hold good faith discussions, 
the question may be raised as to whether the potential 
use of three different ineffective procedures is efficient 
and constructive..  
If the parties do wish to ensure that contract 
modification is seriously considered during each 
consultation, stronger obligations need to be included 
during the Modification Process. The review did reflect 
some options. As stated above, one clause stipulated 
that certain tax exemptions would expire unless they 
are renewed by the agreement of the parties during 
the review process. This type of clause would provide 
impetus to the investor to enter into serious 
discussions in relation to the contract terms. Such a 
mechanism could potentially be extended to other 
provisions of the contract that are perceived as likely to 
require adaptation over the duration of the investment, 
such as any tax or royalty rate, especially if they are 
fixed, and any exemptions.xxii The Periodic Review 
Mechanism in the Australian land use agreement (see 
Note iv) provides that if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement – either to modify the agreement, or not to 
modify the agreement – no further exploration 
contracts can be entered into pursuant to the land use 
agreementxxiii. The Mining Sector Business 
Association, which is party to the land use agreement 
and represents the mining companies, thus has an 
interest in reaching an agreement under the Periodic 
Review Mechanism if it does not want to harm the 
future business of its members. 
Further, Periodic Review Mechanisms could define 
clear standards and criteria for the parties to follow 
during the Modification Process. Some of the Oil 
Contracts, notably Oil Contract 4, are more explicit 
regarding the intended outcome of a modification  
(“offset or alleviate the said economic hardship caused 
by such change [PCC]”). Smith and Wells suggest the 
following formulation, which provides some parameters 
around the issue of determining whether a change 
should be made: 
“In undertaking such review, the Parties shall 
bargain in good faith with a view toward providing 
a fair and equitable division of profits in light of the 
economic factors prevailing at the time of the 
review. 
In undertaking such review the Parties shall be 
guided by, but not limited to, consideration of the 
following factors: 
1. The economic value of the concession. 
2. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated 
by the government within the five-year period 
preceding the date of review. 
3. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated 
by the Concessionaire within the five-year period 
preceding the date of review. 
4. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated 
by third parties to the extent that such agreements 
can be reasonably compared to this Agreement.” 
xxiv
 
Alternatively, an entirely new approach could be 
adopted whereby the parties share, at the outset, their 
financial expectations over the course of the project to 
create a baseline reflecting these expectations. This 
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baseline can be reviewed over the duration of the 
project in order to determine, objectively, whether 
there is a need for renegotiation – in cases where 
either party’s financial expectations are not being met. 
Despite their problems, Periodic Review Mechanisms 
can still play an important role. These mechanisms can 
be the only provision under which a government can 
request changes to the terms of the contract where the 
balance of benefits changes in light of changed 
circumstances. For example, it was suggested by 
practitioners that the mechanisms can add legitimacy 
to a request by a government for amendments when 
changed circumstances in the market result in the 
investor receiving an unexpected level of profit. This 
contrasts with other mechanisms that often apply 
unilaterally to the investor, providing for adjustment to 
the contract terms to restore the economic equilibrium 
expected under the contract, where there has been a 
change (generally government legislation) affecting the 
investor’s share of benefits.xxv On the part of the 
investor, Periodic Review Mechanisms can be used 
internally to convince others within the company that 
changes are necessary, where they are seen as 
desirable for business or political purposes. From this 
perspective, the mechanisms can provide a legal 
underpinning for parties seeking to achieve a business 
or relationship imperative. In any event, the Review 
Mechanism may play an important role in managing 
the relationship between the parties and in particular in 
managing the process of renegotiation. At the very 
least, they act to keep the parties talking to each other 
over the course of the investment.  
To better understand the usefulness of the current 
form of Periodic Review Mechanisms in practice, 
further research could track renegotiations or 
attempted renegotiations under contracts that contain 
such provisions against those that do not, to observe 
the effect of the clause on both the outcome and the 
process of renegotiation, as well as the recourse to 
arbitration.
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Annex 1 
Review Mechanisms in Mining Contract 2 and Oil Contract 10 
Mining Contract 2 - Section 30 – Periodic Review. 
“30.1 Profound Changes in Circumstances. For the purpose of considering Profound Changes in Circumstances 
from those existing on the Effective Date or on the date of the most recent review of this Agreement pursuant to 
this Section 30, the Government on the one hand and the Concessionaire and the Operating Company jointly on 
the other hand, shall at the request of the other consult together. The parties shall meet to review the matter 
raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both. In case Profound Changes in 
Circumstances are established to have occurred, the parties shall effect such change in or clarification of this 
Agreement that they in good faith agree is necessary. 
30.2 Five Year Review. This Agreement shall be subject to periodic review once every five (5) years after the date 
of the start of Production for the purpose of good faith discussions to effect such modifications to this Agreement 
as may be necessary or desirable in the light of any substantial changes in circumstances which may have 
occurred during the previous five years. 
30.3 Other Consultation. In addition to the consultation and review provided by Section 30 [...], each party may at 
any time request a consultation with the other party with respect to any matter affecting the rights and obligations 
of the parties pursuant to this Agreement or any matter relating to Operations. The parties shall meet to review in 
good faith the matter raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both. Subsequent to 
such consultation, the parties shall take such action, if any, that is mutually agreed to address the matter.” 
Oil Contract 10 – Section 36.2 Profound Change in Circumstances 
“(a) The State and the Contractor shall meet if the State or the Contractor gives at least forty-five (45) days’ 
Notice to the other that it reasonably considers a Profound Change in Circumstances to have occurred. At the 
meeting, the State and the Contractor shall review the relevant facts and circumstances and determine whether or 
not a Profound Change in Circumstances has occurred. To the extent that a Profound Change in Circumstances 
has occurred, the State and the Contractor shall enter into good faith discussions to consider and shall make such 
modifications to this Contract as they may through good faith discussions propose as necessary or appropriate to 
restore the economic, fiscal and financial balance of the Contract… 
(c) In addition to the review provided for in Article 36.2(a), the State and the Contractor shall also meet once every 
five (5) years after the Effective Date, on at least forty five (45) days’ prior Notice at the request of either, to review 
and discuss in good faith issues deemed material to the rights and obligations of the State and the Contractor 
pursuant to this Contract by the requesting party. The Parties shall effect such modifications to this Contract that 
the Parties in good faith discussions agree are necessary. 
(d) In addition to the consultation and review provided by Articles 36.2(a) and 36.2(b), either the State or the 
Contractor may at any time request a consultation with the other Party with respect to any matter affecting the 
rights and obligations of the State and the Contractor pursuant to this Contract. The State and the Contractor shall 
meet reasonably promptly after such request for the requested consultation. Subsequent to such consultation, the 
Parties shall take such action, if any, that is in good faith discussions mutually agreed to address the matter. 
(e) Any Notice or request under Articles 36.2(a) through 36.2(d), inclusive, shall include a summary statement of 
the circumstances giving rise to such Notice or request. 
(f) For the purposes of Articles 36.2(a) through 36.2(d), “good faith discussions” and “consultation” shall not 
require a Party to agree to any modifications to this Contract and the lack of agreement is not subject to Article 31 
[i.e., dispute resolution]. 
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Annex 2 
Contract 
N° 
Mining Contracts Signing Date 
1 Mineral Development Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and KPO Resources Incorporated 
November 28, 2001 
2 Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Liberia, China-Union (Hong Kong) Mining Co., LTD. 
And China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Co., LTD. 
January 19, 2009 
3 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and African Aura Resources Limited 
March 14, 2002 
4 Iron Ore Exploration Agreement for the Kitoma Range between 
The Republic of Liberia and BHP Billiton World Exploration Inc. 
May 11, 2005 
5 An Act Approving the Mining Concession Agreement entered into 
by and between Government of the Republic of Liberia and 
Bentley International Trading Corporation 
May 23, 1978  
6 Mineral Exploration Agreement II between The Republic of Liberia 
and Deveton Mining Company 
September 22, 2005 
7 Iron Ore Appraisal and Mineral Exploration Agreement for the 
Putu Range between The Republic of Liberia and Mano River Iron 
Ore (Liberia) Inc. 
May 18, 2005 
8 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and Liberty Gold and Diamond Mining Inc. 
October 26, 2005 
9 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and G-10 Exploration Inc. 
October 26, 2005 
10 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and T-REX Resources Inc. 
October 20, 2005 
11 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and Golden Ventures Inc. 
0ctober 26, 2005 
12 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and Amlib United Minerals Inc. 
March 14, 2002 
13 Concession Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and the 
Liberia Company 
? 
14 Mineral Development Between the Government of Liberia and 
Bea Mountain 
November 28, 2001 
15 An Act to Ratify The Concession Agreement Between The 
Republic of Liberia and Western Cluster Limited, Sesa Gao 
Limited, Bloom Fountain Limited, And Elenilto Minerals And 
Mining LLC 
August 22, 2011 
16 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and Magma Mineral Resources Inc 
October 26, 2005 
17 An Act Ratifying the Amendment to the Mineral Development 
Agreement (MDA) Dated August 17, 2005 between The 
Government of the Republic of Liberia (The Government) and 
Mittal Steel Holding A. G. and Mittal Steel (Liberia) Holdings 
Limited (The Concessionaire) 
December 28, 2006 
18 Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia 
and Craton Developments Inc. 
October 26, 2005 
19 Iron Ore Appraisal and Mineral Exploration Agreement for the 
Goe-Fantro Range between The Republic of Liberia and BHP 
Billiton World Exploration Inc. 
April 22, 2005 
20 Mineral Development Agreement Between The Government of 
the Republic of Liberia and BHP Billiton Iron Ore Holdings  
September 16, 2010 
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Contract 
N° 
Oil Contracts Signing Date 
1 An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract Between the 
National Oil Company of Liberia, Oranto & Chevron-LB 14 
Second Addendum  
September 3, 2010 
2 Production Sharing Contract Between GOL, Regal Liberia Ltd & 
Hydrocarbons Ltd. 
March 11, 2008, 
approved by 
President 
3 An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With 
Addendum for Offshore Liberia Blocks LB 16 & 17 Signed 
Between the Republic of Liberia Represented by the National Oil 
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) and REPSOL Exploration S.A. 
August 17, 2005 
4 An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With 
Addendum for Offshore Liberia Blocks LB 15 Signed Between 
the Republic of Liberia Represented by the National Oil 
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) and Woodside West Africa PTY. 
LTD. 
March 11, 2009 
5 Production Sharing Contract Between The republic of Liberia and 
Hongkong Tongtai Petroleum International Corporation Ltd for 
Offshore Block LB6 and for Block LB7 
Draft 
6 An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract for Block LB-10 
Signed Between the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCOL) 
on Behalf of the Republic of Liberia and Anadarko Liberia Block 
10 Company 
July 23, 2009 
7 An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With 
Addendum for Blocks LB 13 Signed Between the National Oil 
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) on Bahalf of the Republic of 
Liberia and Broadway Consolidated PLC 
May 31, 2005 
8 An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract With Addendum 
for Block LB 11 and 12 Signed Between the National Oil 
Company of Liberia (NOCOL) on Behalf of the Republic of 
Liberia and Oranto Petroleum Limited 
April 16, 2007 
9 An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract Between the 
National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCOL) Representing the 
Republic of Liberia and Oranto Petroleum Limited for Offshore 
Block LB 14 
July 23, 2009 
10 Block 13 as amended and restated in 2013 for Exxon March 8, 2013 
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 David N. Smith and Louis T. Wells Jr., Negotiating Third 
World Mineral Agreements, Promises as Prologue 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1975). 
ii
 Petrocash legal database, available at: 
http://www.petrocash.com/Legal/ (last visited Mar 6, 
2014), and contracts collected by CCSI. 
iii
 See http://www.leiti.org.lr/ (last visited Mar 6, 2014). For 
the purpose of this analysis, the contracts were 
categorized and numbered as set out in Annex 2.  
iv
 The MMDA contains a model Periodic Review 
Mechanism and provides four examples, one of which 
comes from a Liberian contract and one of which is taken 
from the Australian Adnyamathanha Body Corporate 
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (available at: 
http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1756
71/Adnyamathanha_Minerals_Exploration_ILUA_13.2.12.
pdf ). The source of these other clauses in the MMDA is 
unknown. The Periodic Review Mechanism in the 
Australian contract is conceptually different from the 
Liberian mechanisms. Unlike the Liberian mechanisms, it 
is not part of an investment contract but found in a land 
use agreement in which the parties agree to consent to 
the grant of authorized exploration contracts (clause 
3.1(a)(i)). The government of South Australia has 
published three additional land use agreements with 
similar periodic review mechanisms. 
v
 Tanzania Mining Code, Part II, 12 provides for periodic 
review: “The development agreement entered into under 
section 10 shall be subject to periodic performance review 
by parties after every five years”. 
vi
 By September 25, 2013, LEITI had published and 
categorized over 119 contracts according to their industry: 
76 forestry contracts, 19 Mining Contracts, 14 agriculture 
contracts and nine Oil Contracts. For this analysis, we 
analyzed one additional mining contract and one 
additional oil contract that were not published by LEITI. 
vii
 Mining Contracts 1, 2, 5, 12, 14, 15, 17. 
viii
 Oil Contracts 5 and 10. 
ix In Mining Contract 5b the interval is “not less than every 
7 years”. 
x
 Mining Contract 1, 2, 12, 14, 20, and 15, which specifies 
“or earlier” and is therefore similar to Mining Contract 5; 
Oil Contract 5, Article 36.3., and Oil Contract 10, Article 
36.2(c). Oil Contract 10 also specifies a 45-day notice 
period. 
xi
 Mining Contract 2, Article 30.2: “This Agreement shall be 
subject to periodic review once every (5) years after the 
date of the start of Production for the purpose of good faith 
discussions to effect such modifications to this Agreement 
as may be necessary or desirable in the light of any 
substantial changes in circumstances which may have 
occurred during the previous five years.”  
xii
 Mining Contracts 15 and 20. 
xiii
 Mining Contract 1, Article 35.1.: “It is understood that 
this clause subjects the Parties to a simple obligation to 
consider in good faith the proposed modification of the  
Agreement […] This Agreement shall remain unaltered 
and in force during any such period of consideration.”  
xiv
 Mining Contract 5, Article 33. 
xv
 Model Mine Development Agreement 1.0., Clause 36.0. 
Australian land use agreement is example 4. 
xvi
 Oil Contract 10, Article 36.2(f). 
                                                                               
xvii
 Oil Contract 2, Article 35.3. 
xviii
 Oil Contract 10, Article 36.2(b): “For the purposes of 
this Article 36.2, “Profound Change in Circumstances” 
means such changes […] in the economic conditions of 
the petroleum industry worldwide or in Liberia, or such 
changes in the economic, political or social circumstances 
existing in Liberia specifically or elsewhere in the world at 
large as to result in such a material and fundamental 
alteration of the conditions, assumptions and bases relied 
upon by the Parties at the Relevant Date that the overall 
economic, fiscal and financial balance reasonably 
anticipated by them will no longer as a practical matter be 
achievable.”  
xix
 Some Oil Contracts provide additional details and 
specify “that the economic benefits to the Parties shall not 
be reduced as a result of exercising the terms of this 
Article” (Oil Contract 2, Article 35.3., 2005). While the aim 
is to restore the equilibrium that was initially intended by 
the parties the re-equilibration is not automatic, but subject 
to the agreement of the parties. Other contracts require 
the parties to “make the necessary revisions and 
adjustments to this Contract in order to offset or alleviate 
the said economic hardship caused by such change, 
maintain such expected economic benefits to each of the 
parties, recognizing the risk which is it has been 
undertaken by the Contractor under this Contract, 
provided that the economic benefits to the Parties shall not 
be reduced as a result of exercising the terms if this 
Article.” (Oil Contract 4, Article 35.3.). 
xx
 Mining Contract 2. 
xxi Whereas pro bono legal experts exist, it is not easy to 
find qualified pro bono economic and financial experts. 
xxii
 See Mining Contract 5. 
xxiii
 2.2(e)(i): If no agreement has been made “no accepted 
exploration contract may be entered into pursuant to 
clause 5.1 of the exploration contract conditions”. In this 
example, however, the rights and obligations of the parties 
to existing exploration contracts are not impacted: 
2.2(f)(ii): 2.2(e) “does not in any way affect […] any 
accepted exploration contracts entered into prior to the 
relevant date.” 
xxiv
 Smith and Wells Jr., 1975, op. cit. 
xxv
 Such as stabilization clauses, including freezing 
clauses and economic balancing clauses. For a 
description of these clauses, see for example: Frank 
Alexander, “Comment on articles on stabilization by Piero 
Bernardini, Lorenzo Cotula and AFM Maniruzzaman”, 
Journal of World Energy Law & Business (2009) Vol. 2, 
No. 3, p. 244. 
